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Abstract
Speech given at Session 3: Challenge Facing Resource Development. Mr. Andersen presented
is a set of projections rooted in what we understand to be the current regimes of policy in the United
States and elsewhere. Three key propositions inform considerations regarding long-term energy
market developments: the prospect for energy demand growth is substantial and will be based
on fossil fuels; growth will be centered in developing countries, particularly Asia, where living
standards are rising; thanks to technological know-how, resource availability will not constrain
energy supply development.
ENERGY OUTLOOK AND CONSUMPTION
Arthur Andersen*
Before I start the discussion of the energy outlook, I would
like to make a couple of comments about where I am in the
Department of Energy. I am part of the Energy Information Ad-
ministration and I know that for non-U.S. participants in this
meeting, there might be some confusion of where that fits in the
Department of Energy.
The Energy Information Administration was created as a
semi-independent entity within the Department of Energy and is
responsible both to the Secretary of Energy and to Congress. Its
main task is to provide information on developments in energy
markets, either current or prospectively, without any policy advo-
cacy. We do not make policy. We do a lot of analysis of policy
initiatives but in no way do we try to develop advocacy for a par-
ticular position. So what I present is a set of projections rooted
in what we understand to be the current regimes of policy in the
United States and elsewhere.
Three key propositions inform considerations regarding
long-term energy market developments:
* The prospect for energy demand growth is substantial and
will be based on fossil fuels.
* Growth will be centered in developing countries, particu-
larly Asia, where living standards are rising.
* Thanks to technological know-how, resource availability
will not constrain energy supply development.
In 1995, world energy consumption exceeded 360 quadril-
lion Btu's ("quads") or 8,500 million tons of oil equivalent
("MTOEs").' Fossil fuels provided eighty-five percent of world
energy supply with oil the most important fuel followed by coal
and natural gas. By 2015, in a reference or "Business as Usual"
case, world consumption is expected to increase by 200 quads or
4,500 MTOEs. Anticipated growth in the next twenty years is
expected to add to world energy requirements an amount
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roughly equal to total world energy use in 1970. Fossil fuels are
still projected to supply more than eighty-five percent of energy
needs in 2015. The role of oil is expected to diminish somewhat,
but production will rise almost fifty percent with daily supply to-
taling nearly 105 mbd (compared to 69 mbd in 1995).
Amongst all fuels, natural gas use is expected to rise most
rapidly, doubling over the next two decades. Non-fossil fuel use
loses some share as nuclear energy supply diminishes, a result of
market competition from natural gas, public concern about the
safety of nuclear reactor operations, and problems associated
with the disposal of nuclear waste, especially in the United
States.
The regional composition of energy demand is undergoing
dramatic change. Leading industrialized countries in North
America, Western Europe, and Asia accounted for more than
one half of world energy consumption in 1995. Their share will
drop to about forty-six percent within the next two decades. By
2015, developing Asia, including especially China and India, will
consume more energy than all of North America, and the level
of energy consumption in developing Asia will exceed Western
Europe levels by almost a factor of two. In 1995, consumption
levels in these two regions were roughly equal.
Changes in relative levels of energy consumption will dra-
matically shift energy market trading patterns. Over the next
twenty years, the volume of oil produced for export will rise from
about forty-eight percent of total supply to nearly sixty percent.
Whereas industrialized countries, including especially North
America and Western Europe, are the largest importers of oil in
1995, by 2015, Asia Pacific countries, led by China, will come to
play a major role in oil trade. China is likely to become the larg-
est customer for Middle Eastern oil exports.
Many uncertainties attend long-term energy projections.
Key among these are rates of economic growth and the relation
of energy use to changing levels of economic welfare. In indus-
trialized countries, projected economic growth is slower than
that expected for emerging economies, especially in Asia and
South America. Expected higher rates of growth in industrializ-
ing countries accounts in large part for their emergence as key
consumers of energy. Were growth rates to falter, so too would
increased need for energy supplies. Higher or lower growth
ENERGY OUTLOOK AND CONSUMPTION
rates within the range of historic experience could affect world
energy requirements by 100 quads or more (up or down) by
2015.
Another source of uncertainty is the relation of growth in
energy use to overall growth in economic output. To what ex-
tent is energy growth coupled with growth in GDP? In general,
industrialized countries have relatively low energy/GDP ratios.
Higher income leads to expenditures which are not especially
energy intensive. As income rises, goods purchases do not rise as
rapidly as purchases of services. While energy use per capita is
high relative to world standards, it is not increasing even as living
standards rise.
In emerging economies, rising income usually means an at
least proportional increase in energy consumption. Cars for per-
sonal transport, modern appliances for household services,
larger homes with heat and air conditioning all have high in-
come elasticity of demand. Thus, rising living standards and in-
creased energy use go hand in hand.
In developing Asia, with a population of more than three
billion people, energy use per capita is currently at low levels.
However, use is rising more rapidly than in industrialized coun-
tries. Substantial variations in energy demand projections can
arise from different views on rates of growth in per capita use. If
future growth in oil demand in China and India were to match
the historical rate for South Korea, their combined consumption
in 2015 would be 45.5 mbd higher than projected in the refer-
ence case. In emerging economies, the forecast generally is for
substantial increases in energy use per capita. However, at the
end of the projection period, use per capita is still only a fraction
of current use rates in developed countries. World demand for
energy could be much higher by 2015 if growth in energy use
per capita is under-predicted.
As noted at the outset, the energy projections presented
here are developed in a business-as-usual context wherein ex-
isting energy policies are stable. Growing concerns regarding
global warming is only one factor that could lead to important
changes in policies throughout the world economy.
The projection presented was developed only a few years af-
ter the Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted.
More than 160 nations have endorsed the need to stabilize world
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carbon emissions and yet this outlook depicts an energy world in
2015 which is fossil fuel-based, with worldwide emissions of car-
bon approaching ten billion metric tons - an increase of four
billion tons relative to 1990 levels. Current trends in cost and
availability favor continued and increasing use of carbon-based
fuels. Compositional changes in supply will favor greater reli-
ance on natural gas, which generates only half as much carbon
per unit of heat as does coal. However, especially in Asia, the
main fuel of choice will be coal. Thus, not only does economic
growth dictate larger energy requirements in this region, but the
energy requirements will be served by relatively high carbon
emitting fuel sources. As a consequence, even if all industrial-
ized countries were to achieve stabilization of carbon emissions
at 1990 levels (a goal endorsed in the RIO treaty), emissions
worldwide would rise by three billion tons over the next two de-
cades and emerging economies would come to account for more
than half of world emissions on an annual basis.
As the debate on climate change has intensified, some have
suggested that resource depletion of oil and other fossil fuels
could cause energy prices to escalate to a degree that energy de-
mand growth could be checked or diverted to non-carbon en-
ergy sources. In the mid and late 1970s, it was easy to find public
discussion and indeed many projections in which oil prices were
escalating and encouraging a search for energy substitutes. Such
discussions are now rare.
Most forecasts project relatively stable oil prices over the
next ten to twenty years, even with large increases in overall de-
mand. The International Energy Outlook projection has prices ris-
ing ten to fifteen percent per barrel by 2015, even while oil de-
mand increases by more than fifty percent from current levels.
This does not mean that no one expects sharp short-term oil
price variations over the projection period. Events equivalent to
the Gulf War or a coup which disrupts current production are
likely to occur. However, over time, underlying production ca-
pabilities are likely to continue to evolve, which enable larger
supplies of energy at relatively stable long term costs. We have to
thank advances in technological capabilities to produce energy
for the prospect of stable energy prices. We now know more
about how to search for oil, how to extract it, even in very diffi-
cult producing environments, than we did a decade or more
ago. As a consequence, prospective production capability is ris-
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ing in all areas of the world. Even in the United States, with a
very mature resource base, we have, in the past three years, low-
ered our price projection by nearly one third while not reducing
expected levels of production. Production cost reductions, due
to improved technology, have compensated for poorer oil price
prospects.
In 1980, worldwide proven oil reserves were 655 billion bar-
rels. By 1995, they exceeded 1017 billion barrels - an increase
of fifty-five percent. At the same time, the price of oil in 1995
was only US$17 compared to US$60 in 1980 (in 1995 real dol-
lars) and an average in excess of US$40 between 1975 and 1985.
Lower price and higher production prospects for oil and
other energy sources are not solely a product of technological
advancement. Significant political change has evolved since the
1970s, which improve the economics of energy development
even without technological change. Tax regimes have been
moderated. Changes in political regimes have opened new areas
to investment and development. However, the demonstration of
technological potential in a wide variety of applications has
helped spur political review and a search for policies that help
assure competitive participation in evolving energy markets.
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